Abstract. This paper surveys recent work on the design and analysis of key agreement protocols that are based on the intractability of the Di eHellman problem. The focus is on protocols that have been standardized, or are in the process of being standardized, by organizations such as ANSI, IEEE, ISO/IEC, and NIST. The practical and provable security aspects of these protocols are discussed.
Introduction
Authenticated key establishment protocols are designed to provide two or more speci ed entities communicating over an open network with a shared secret key which may subsequently be used to achieve some cryptographic goal such as con dentiality or data integrity. Secure authenticated key establishment protocols are important as e ective replacements for traditional key establishment achieved using expensive and ine cient couriers.
Key establishment protocols come in various avors. In key transport protocols, a key is created by one entity and securely transmitted to the second entity, while in key agreement protocols both entities contribute information which is used to derive the shared secret key. In symmetric protocols the two entities a priori possess common secret information, while in asymmetric protocols the two entities share only public information that has been authenticated. This paper is concerned with two-party authenticated key agreement protocols in the asymmetric setting.
The design of asymmetric authenticated key agreement protocols has a checkered history. Over the years, numerous protocols have been proposed to meet a variety of desirable security and performance requirements. Many of these protocols were subsequently found to be awed, and then either were modi ed to resist the new attacks, or were totally abandoned. After a series of attacks and modi cations, only those surviving protocols which had received substantial public scrutiny and were believed to resist all known attacks were deemed secure for practical usage. Protocols that evolve from this`attack-response' methodology are said to provide heuristic security.
attributes as a key established face-to-face | for example, it should be shared by the (two) speci ed entities, it should be distributed uniformly at random from the key space, and no unauthorized (and computationallybounded) entity should learn anything about the key. A protocol achieving this idealistic goal could then be used as a drop-in replacement for face-to-face key establishment without the need to review system security in much the same way as pseudorandom bit generators can replace random bit generators.
Unfortunately, such an abstract goal is not easily attained and it is not an easy task to identify and enunciate the precise security requirements of authenticated key establishment. Nonetheless over the years several concrete security and performance attributes have been identi ed as desirable. These are informally described in the remainder of this section. Recent more formal attempts at capturing concrete security de nitions are discussed in x7.
The rst step is to identify what types of attacks it is vital for a protocol to withstand. Since protocols are used over open networks like the Internet, a secure protocol should be able to withstand both passive attacks (where an adversary attempts to prevent a protocol from achieving its goals by merely observing honest entities carrying out the protocol) and active attacks (where an adversary additionally subverts the communications by injecting, deleting, altering or replaying messages).
The second step is to identify what concrete security goals it is vital for a protocol to provide. The fundamental security goals described below are considered to be vital in any application. The other security and performance attributes are important in some environments, but less important in others.
Fundamental security goals. Let A and B be two honest entities, i.e., legitimate entities who execute the steps of a protocol correctly.
1. implicit key authentication. A key agreement protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication (of B to A) if entity A is assured that no other entity aside from a speci cally identi ed second entity B can possibly learn the value of a particular secret key. Note that the property of implicit key authentication does not necessarily mean that A is assured of B actually possessing the key. 2. explicit key authentication. A key agreement protocol is said to provide explicit key con rmation (of B to A) if entity A is assured that the second entity B has actually computed the agreed key. The protocol provides implicit key con rmation if A is assured that B can compute the agreed key. While explicit key con rmation appears to provide stronger assurances to A than implicit key con rmation (in particular, the former implies the latter), it appears that, for all practical purposes, the assurances are in fact the same. That is, the assurance that A requires in practice is merely that B can compute the key rather than that B has actually computed the key. Indeed in practice, even if a protocol does provide explicit key con rmation, it cannot guarantee to A that B will not lose the key between key establishment and key use. Thus it would indeed seem that implicit key con rmation and explicit key con rmation are in practice very similar, and the remainder of this paper will not distinguish between the two. Key con rmation by itself is not a useful service | it is only desirable when accompanied with implicit key authentication. A key agreement protocol is said to provide explicit key authentication (of B to A) if both implicit key authentication and key con rmation (of B to A) are provided. A key agreement protocol which provides implicit key authentication to both participating entities is called an authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol, while one providing explicit key authentication to both participating entities is called an authenticated key agreement with key con rmation (AKC) protocol.
Key agreement protocols in which the services of implicit key authentication or explicit key authentication are provided to only one (unilateral) rather than both (mutual) participating entities are also useful in practice, for example in encryption applications where only authentication of the intended recipient is required. Such unilateral key agreement protocols (e.g., ElGamal key agreement 33, Protocol 12.52]) are not considered in this paper.
Other desirable security attributes. A number of other desirable security 1. Anonymity of the entities participating in a run of the protocol. 2. Role symmetry (the messages transmitted have the same structure). 3. Non-interactiveness (the messages transmitted between the two entities are independent of each other). 4. Non-reliance on encryption in order to meet export restrictions. 5. Non-reliance on hash functions since these are notoriously hard to design. 6. Non-reliance on timestamping since it is di cult to implement securely in practice.
3 Di e-Hellman key agreement
This section describes the basis of Di e-Hellman based key agreement protocols and motivates the modern protocols we describe in x4 and x5 by illustrating some of the de ciencies of early protocols. The mathematical tool commonly used for devising key agreement protocols is the Di e-Hellman problem: given a cyclic group G of prime order n, a generator g of G, and elements g x , g y 2 G (where x; y 2 R 1; n ? 1]), nd g xy . ( We use x 2 R S to denote that x is chosen uniformly at random from the set S.)
This problem is closely related to the widely-studied discrete logarithm problem (given G, n, g, and g x where x 2 R 0; n?1], nd x), and there is strong evidence that the two problems are computationally equivalent (e.g., see 16] and 32]).
For concreteness, this paper deals with the case where G is a prime order subgroup of Z p , the multiplicative group of the integers modulo a prime p. However, the discussion applies equally well to any group of prime order in which the discrete logarithm problem is computationally intractable, for example prime order subgroups of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a nite eld. The following notation is used throughout the paper. . MAC A message authentication code algorithm (e.g., 4, 6, 7] ). The operator mod p will henceforth be omitted.
The domain parameters (p; q; g) are commonto all entities. For the remainder of this paper, we will assume that static public keys are exchanged via certicates. Cert A denotes A's public-key certi cate, containing a string of information that uniquely identi es A (such as A's name and address), her static public key Y A , and a certifying authority CA's signature over this information. Other information may be included in the data portion of the certi cate, including the domain parameters if these are not known from context. Any other entity B can use his authentic copy of the CA's public key to verify A's certi cate, thereby obtaining an authentic copy of A's static public key.
We assume that the CA has veri ed that A possess the private key a corresponding to her static public key Y A . This is done in order to prevent potential unknown key-share attacks whereby an adversary E registers A's public key Y A as its own and subsequently deceives B into believing that A's messages originated from E (see 15] for more details). Checking knowledge of private keys is in general a sensible precaution and is often vital for theoretical analysis. We also assume that the CA has veri ed the validity of A's static public key Y A , i.e., the CA has veri ed that 1 < Y A < p and that (Y A ) q 1 (mod p); this process is called public Since each entity is assured that it possesses an authentic copy of the other entity's public key, the static Di e-Hellman protocol o ers implicit key authentication. A major drawback, however, is that A and B compute the same shared secret K = g ab for each run of the protocol.
The drawbacks of the ephemeral and static Di e-Hellman protocols can be alleviated by using both static and ephemeral keying material in the formation of shared secrets. An example of an early protocol designed in this manner is the MTI/C0 protocol 31]. This protocol appears secure at rst glance. Unfortunately, it turns out that this attempt to combine static and ephemeral Di e-Hellman protocols has introduced some subtle problems. As an example, consider the following instance of the small subgroup attack 29] on the MTI/C0 protocol. An adversary E replaces T A and T B with the identity element 1. Both A and B now form K = 1, which is also known to E. This attack demonstrates that the MTI/C0 protocol (as described above) does not o er implicit key authentication.
The 3 protocols described in this section demonstrate some of the subtleties involved in designing secure authenticated key agreement protocols. Other kinds of attacks that have been identi ed besides small subgroup attacks include:
1. intruder-in-the-middle attack 37]. In this classic attack on ephemeral Di eHellman, the adversary replaces A's and B's ephemeral keys g x and g y with keys g x and g y of its choice. E can then compute the session keys formed by A and B (g xy and g xy , respectively), and use these to translate messages exchanged between A and B that are encrypted under the session keys. 2. re ection attack 34]. A's challenges are replayed back to A as messages purportedly from B. 3. interleaving attack 12, 21] . The adversary reuses messages transmitted during a run of the protocol in other runs of the protocol. Such attacks are typically very subtle and require little computational overhead. They highlight the necessity of some kind of formal analysis to avoid the use of awed protocols.
AK protocols
This section discusses some AK protocols currently proposed in standards. We present the two-pass KEA, Uni ed Model, and MQV protocols, and their onepass variants.
Before we present the AK protocols it is worth reminding the reader that, as discussed in x2, it is highly desirable for key establishment protocols to provide explicit key authentication. Thus, when AK protocols are used in practice, key con rmation should usually be added to the protocols. Nonetheless it is worth presenting the raw AK protocols since key con rmation can be achieved in a variety of ways and it is sometimes desirable to separate key con rmation from implicit key authentication and move the burden of key con rmation from the key establishment mechanism to the application. For example, if the key is to be subsequently used to achieve con dentiality, then encryption with the key can begin on some (carefully chosen) known data. Other systems may provide key con rmation during a`real-time' telephone conversation. We present a generic method for securely incorporating key con rmation into AK protocols in x5.
KEA
The Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) was designed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and declassi ed in To illustrate the need for the features of KEA, we demonstrate how the protocol is weakened when certain modi cations are made. This serves to further illustrate that designing secure key agreement protocols is a delicate and di cult task, and that subtle changes to a protocol can render it insecure.
Validation of public keys { verifying that they lie in the subgroup of order q. Suppose that A does not verify that (R B ) q 1 (mod p). Then, as observed by Lim and Lee 30], it may be possible for a malicious B to learn information about A's static private key a as follows using a variant of the small subgroup attack. Suppose that p ? 1 has a prime factor l of small bitlength Validation of public keys { verifying that they lie in the interval 2; p ? 1] . Suppose that A does not verify that 1 < Y B < p and 1 < R B < p.
Then an adversary E can launch the following unknown key-share attack. E gets Y E = 1 certi ed as its static public key. E then forwards A's ephemeral public key R A to B alleging it came from E. After B replies to E with R B , E sends R 0 B = 1 to A alleging it came from B. A computes K AB = g bx + 1 and B computes K BE = g bx + 1. Thus B is coerced into sharing a key with A without B's knowledge. Use of a key derivation function. The key derivation function kdf is used to derive a session key from the shared secret key K. One reason for doing this is to mix together strong bits and potential weak bits of K | weak bits are certain bits of information about K that can be correctly predicted with non-negligible advantage.
Another reason is to destroy the algebraic relationships between the shared secret K and the static and ephemeral public keys. This can help prevent against some kinds of known-key attacks, such as Burmester's triangle attack 17] which we describe next. An adversary E, whose static key pair is (c; g c ), observes a run of protocol between A and B in which ephemeral public keys g x and g y are exchanged; the resulting shared secret is K AB = g ay +g bx . E then initiates a run of the protocol with A, replaying g y as its ephemeral public key; the resulting secret which only A can compute is K AE = g ay +g cx , where g x is A's ephemeral public key. Similarly, E initiates a run of the protocol with B, replaying g x as its ephemeral public key; the resulting secret which only B can compute is K BE = g bx + g cy , where g y is B's ephemeral public key. If E can somehow learn K AE and K BE (this is the known-key portion of the attack), then E can compute K AB = K AE + K BE ? g cx ? g cy . The check that K 6 = 0. This check is actually unnecessary as the following argument shows. Since (g b ) q (g y ) q 1 (mod p), we have that (g bx ) q (g ay ) q 1 (mod p). Now, K = 0 if and only if g bx ?g ay (mod p). But this is impossible since otherwise (g bx ) q (?g ay ) q (?1) q ?1 (mod p).
Security notes. KEA does not provide (full) forward secrecy since an adversary who learns a and b can compute all session keys established by A and B.
See also The check K = 1 ensures that K has order q. Kaliski 27] has recently observed that Protocol 6 does not possess the unknown key-share attribute. This is demonstrated by the following on-line attack. An adversary E intercepts A's ephemeral public key R A intended for B, and computes R E = R A (Y A ) RA g ?1 , e = (R E ) ?1 mod q, and Y E = g e . E then gets Y E certi ed as her static public key (note that E knows the corresponding private key e), and transmits R E to B. B responds by sending R B to E, which E forwards to A. Both A and B compute the same session key k, however B mistakenly believes that he shares k with E. We emphasize that lack of the unknown key-share attribute does not contradict the fundamental goal of mutual implicit key authentication | by de nition the provision of implicit key authentication is only considered in the case where B engages in the protocol with an honest entity (which E isn't). If an application using Protocol 6 is concerned with the lack of the unknown key-share attribute under such on-line attacks, then appropriate key con rmation should be added, for example as speci ed in Protocol 8 in x5.
One-pass variants
The purpose of a one-pass AK protocol is for entities A and B to agree upon a session key by only having to transmit one message from A to B | this assumes that A a priori has an authentic copy of B's static public key. One-pass protocols can be useful in applications where only one entity is on-line, such as secure email. Their main security drawbacks are that they do not o er knownkey security (since an adversary can replay A's ephemeral public key to B) and forward secrecy (since entity B does not contribute a random per-message component).
The 3 two-pass AK protocols (KEA, Uni ed Model, MQV) presented in this section can be converted to one-pass AK protocols by simply setting B's ephemeral public key equal to his static public key. We illustrate this next for the one-pass variant of the MQV protocol. A summary of the security services of the 3 one-pass variants is provided in Table 1 
AKC protocols
This section discusses AKC protocols and describes a method to derive AKC protocols from AK protocols.
The following three-pass AKC protocol 13] is derived from the Uni ed Model AK protocol (Protocol 5) by adding the MACs of the ow number, identities, and the ephemeral public keys. Here, H 1 and H 2 are`independent' hash functions. In practice, one may choose H 1 (m) = H(10; m) and H 2 (m) = H(01; m), where H is a cryptographic hash function.
The MACs are computed under the shared key k 0 , which is di erent from the session key k; Protocol 8 thus o ers implicit key con rmation. If explicit key con rmation were to be provided by using the session key k as the MAC key, then a passive adversary would learn some information about k | the MAC of a known message under k. The adversary can use this to distinguish k from a key selected uniformly at random from the key space. This variant therefore sacri ces the desired goal that a protocol establish a computationally indistinguishable key. The maxim that a key establishment protocol can be used as a drop-in replacement for face-to-face key establishment therefore no longer applies and in theory security must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. We therefore prefer Protocol 8. In a similar manner, one can derive three-pass AKC protocols from the KEA (KEA with key con rmation) and MQV (MQV with key con rmation) AK protocols. The AKC variants of the Uni ed Model and MQV protocols are being considered for inclusion in ANSI X9. 63 3] .
A summary of the security services provided by the 3 AKC variants is given in Table 1 in x6. This table illustrates why AKC protocols may be preferred over AK protocols in practice. First, the incorporation of key con rmation may provide additional security attributes which are not present in the AK protocol. For example, addition of key con rmation in the manner described above makes the MQV protocol resistant to unknown key-share attacks. Second, the security properties of AKC protocols appear to be better understood; see also the discussion in x7.1. Note that since the MACs can be computed e ciently, this method of adding key con rmation to an AK protocol does not place a signi cant computational burden on the key establishment mechanism.
Comparison
This section compares the security and e ciency of the protocols presented in x4 and x5. Security services. { pp indicates that the assurance is provided to A no matter whether A initiated the protocol or not.
{ p ? indicates that the assurance is provided modulo a theoretical technicality. { p I indicates that the assurance is provided to A only if A is the protocol's initiator.
{ indicates that the assurance is not provided to A by the protocol.
The names of the services have been abbreviated to save space: IKA denotes implicit key authentication, EKA explicit key authentication, K-KS known-key security, FS forward secrecy, K-CI key-compromise impersonation, and UK-S unknown key-share.
The provision of these assurances is considered in the case that both A and B are honest and have always executed the protocol correctly. The requirement that A and B are honest is certainly necessary for the provision of any service by a key establishment protocol: no key establishment protocol can protect against a dishonest entity who chooses to reveal the session key... just as no encryption scheme can guard against an entity who chooses to reveal con dential data. E ciency. The work done by each entity is dominated by the time to perform the modular exponentiations. The total number of modular exponentiations per entity for the KEA, Uni ed Model, and MQV AK protocols is 4, 4, and 3.5, respectively. If precomputations (of quantities involving the entity's static and ephemeral keys and the other entity's static keys) are discounted, then the total number of on-line modular exponentiations per entity reduces to 2, 2, and 2.5, respectively.
As noted in x5, MACs can be computed e ciently and hence the AKC variants have essentially the same computational overhead as their AK counterparts. They do, however, require an extra ow.
Provable security
This section discusses methods that have been used to formally analyze key agreement protocols. The goal of these methods is to facilitate the design of secure protocols that avoid subtle aws like those described in x3. We examine two approaches, provable security and formal methods, focusing on the former.
Provable security was invented in the 1980's and applied to encryption schemes and signature schemes. The process of proving security of a protocol comes in ve stages:
1. Speci cation of model. Formal methods. These are methods for analyzing cryptographic protocols in which the communications system is described using a formal speci cation language which has some mathematical basis, from which security properties of the protocol can be inferred. (See 38] and 28] for surveys on formal methods.)
The most widely used of these methods are those related to the BAN logic of Burrows, Abadi and Needham 18], which was extended by van Oorschot 40] to enable the formal analysis of authenticated key agreement protocols in the asymmetric setting. Such methods begin with a set of beliefs for the participants and use logical inference rules to derive a belief that the protocol goals have been obtained. Such formal methods have been useful in uncovering aws and redundancies in protocols. However, they su er from a number of shortcomings when considered as tools for designing high-assurance protocols. First, a proof that a protocol is logically correct does not imply that it is secure. This is especially the case because the process of converting a protocol into a formal speci cation may itself be subject to subtle aws. Second, there is no clear security model associated with the formal systems used and thus it is hard to assess whether the implied threat model corresponds with the requirements of an application. Therefore, we believe that provable security techniques o er greater assurance than formal methods and we focus on provable security for the remainder of this section.
Bellare-Rogaway model of distributed computing
Work on the design of provably secure authenticated key agreement has largely focused on the Bellare-Rogaway model of distributed computing 9,10].
The Bellare-Rogaway model, depicted in Figure 9 , is a formal model of communication over an open network in which the adversary E is a orded enormous power. She controls all communication between entities, and can at any time ask an entity to reveal its static private key. Furthermore, she may at any time initiate sessions between any two entities, engage in multiple sessions with the same entity at the same time, and ask an entity to enter a session with itself. We provide an informal description of the Bellare-Rogaway model, and informal definitions of the goals of secure AK and AKC protocols. For complete descriptions, see 9, 10, 13] .
In the model, E is equipped with a collection of s A;B oracles. s A;B models entity A who believe she is communicating with entity B for the s th time. E is allowed to make three types of queries of its oracles:
Send( A;B ; x): E gives a particular oracle x as input and learns the oracle's response. Reveal( A;B ): E learns the session key (if any) the oracle currently holds. Corrupt(A): E learns A's static private key. When E asks an oracle a query, the oracle computes its response using the description of the protocol. Security goals are de ned in the context of running E in the presence of these oracles.
Secure key agreement is now captured by a test involving an additional Test query. At the end of its experiment, E selects a fresh oracle s A;B | this is an oracle which has accepted a session key k, and where the adversary has not learned k by trivial means (either by corrupting A or B, or by issuing a Reveal query to s A;B or to any t B;A oracle which has had a matching conversation with s A;B ) | and asks it Test query. The oracle replies with either its session key k or a random key, and the adversary's job is to decide which key it has been given. (ii) the MAC is secure; and (iii) H 1 and H 2 are independent random oracles.
A random oracle is a`black-box' random function which is supplied to all entities, including the adversary. The assumption that H, H 1 and H 2 are random oracles is a very powerful one and facilitates security analysis. This so-called random oracle model was introduced and popularized by Bellare and Rogaway 8] . In practice, the random oracles can be instantiated with hash functions | therefore the security proofs in the random model are no longer valid in the practical implementation. Nonetheless, and despite recent results demonstrating the limitations of the random oracle model 19], it is a thesis that protocols proven secure in the random oracle provide higher security assurances than protocols deemed secure by ad-hoc means.
To see that Protocol 5 is not a secure AK protocol in the Bellare-Rogaway model if the adversary is allowed to make Reveal queries, consider the following interleaving/re ection attack. Suppose that A initiates 2 runs of the protocol; let A's ephemeral public keys be g x and g x in the rst and second runs, respectively. The adversary E then replays g x and g x to A in the rst and second rounds respectively, purportedly as B's ephemeral public keys. A computes both session keys as k = H(g ab kg xx ). E can now Reveal one session key, and thus also learn the other.
It is conjectured in 13] that the modi cation of Protocol 5 in which the session key is formed as k = H(g ay kg bx ) is a secure AK protocol assuming only that the Di e-Hellman problem is hard and that H is a random oracle.
A modular approach
Recently, Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk 5] have suggested an approach to the design of provably secure key agreement protocols that di ers from the BellareRogaway model. Their approach is a modular approach and starts with protocols that are secure in a model of idealized authenticated communication and then systematically transforms them into protocols which are secure in the realistic unauthenticated setting. This approach has the advantage that a new proof of security is not required for each protocol | instead once the approach is justi ed it can be applied to any protocol that works in the ideal model. On the other hand, it is less clear what practical guarantees are provided so the evaluation of whether the guarantees are appropriate in an application is perhaps less understood. The following is an informal overview of their approach.
Authenticators. Authenticators are key to the systematic transformations at the heart of the modular approach. They are compilers that take as input a protocol designed for authenticated networks, and transforms it into an`equivalent' protocol for unauthenticated networks. The notion of equivalence or emulation is formalized as follows. A protocol P 0 designed for unauthenticated networks is said to emulate a protocol P designed for authenticated networks, if for each adversary E 0 of P 0 there exists an adversary E of P such that for all inputs x, the views V P;E (x) and V P 0 ;E 0(x) are computationally indistinguishable. (The view V P;E (x) of a protocol P which is run on input x in the presence of an adversary E is the random variable describing the cumulative outputs of E and all the legitimate entities.) MT-Authenticators. In 5], authenticators are realized using the simpler idea of an MT-authenticator which emulates the most straightforward message transmission (MT) protocol in which a single message is passed from A to B as depicted in Figure 10 . Figure 11 illustrates the protocol sig which is proven in 5] to be an MT-authenticator. In the gure, sign A () denotes A's signature using a signature scheme that is secure against chosen message attacks (e.g., 11, 22] ). Now an MT-authenticator can be used to construct a compiler C as follows: given a protocol P, P 0 = C (P) is the protocol obtained by applying to each message transmitted by P. It is proven in 5] that C is indeed an authenticator. Key establishment. Finally, this MT-authenticator is used to build a secure authenticated key agreement protocol. It is rst shown in 5] that ephemeral Di e-Hellman EDH (Protocol 1) is a secure key establishment protocol for authenticated networks by showing that it emulates traditional face-to-face key establishment as described in x2. Then, EDH is emulated using C sig . The result C sig (EDH) is a secure six-pass authenticated key agreement protocol. Combining messages from di erent ows, and replacing the challenges N A and N B with the ephemeral public keys g x and g y , respectively, yields the three-pass BCK protocol, depicted in Figure 12 .
The BCK protocol is similar to Key Agreement Mechanism 7 in ISO/IEC 11770- 3 25] . In the latter, the MACs of the signatures under the shared secret K = g xy are also included in ows 2 and 3, thus providing explicit key con rmation, instead of just implicit key con rmation as provided by the BCK protocol. That is, can the reductions used in the proofs be untilized to obtain meaningful measures of exact security 11]? (Exact security is a concrete quanti cation of the security guaranteed by a protocol in terms of the perceived security of the underlying cryptographic primitives, e.g., the Di e-Hellman problem or a secure MAC algorithm.)
Two important tasks that remain are to devise a provably secure two-pass AK protocol, and to provide formal de nitions for secure one-pass key agreement protocols.
